The Army’s training establishments are failing children
The British Army has quietly published the findings of its own inquiry into how its training establishments handle complaints of unacceptable behaviour. These findings cover the Army Foundation College (AFC) in Harrogate, where around 1,500 children aged 16 and 17 are in training at any one time. According to its report, AFC’s safeguarding policy was 'very poorly’ implemented, its oversight was ‘ineffective’ and the recommendations of two decades’ worth of previous inquiries had not been embedded.
On 21 January 2026, the Army published the outcome of its ‘Service Inquiry into Army training establishments' handling of complaints of unacceptable behaviours’. The report focused in particular on the impact of the recently implemented ‘Zero Tolerance’ policy towards sexual offences and relationships between instructors and trainees, as well as unacceptable sexual behaviour more broadly. The Service Inquiry set out a series of shortcomings in the manner in which the Army dealt with complaints at training facilities, including at AFC Harrogate, the UK’s sole training establishment for under-18 recruits.
The Service Inquiry found three major shortcomings at initial Army training establishments:
There was a gulf between established Army policy and the actual ‘very poor’ implementation of that policy at training establishments;
The internal and external oversight systems in place at initial training establishments were found to be ‘ineffective’, and this was compounded by a misplaced confidence by senior leadership in the efficacy of these oversight systems;
The changes recommended by a series of previous inquiries and reviews, including the landmark Deepcut Review 20 years ago, ‘had not been embedded’ in the Army.
As a consequence, the Service Inquiry concluded that continuing to fail to properly deal with complaints of misconduct – or to prevent them from occurring – represents an existential threat to the Army’s ability to recruit. The authors of the report further stipulated that, unless these continuing shortcomings are addressed, the Army’s very ‘licence to operate’ is at risk, ‘without [which], we cannot undertake our core role of protecting the Nation’.
Given the seriousness of these concerns – and because CRIN has previously documented a decade of abuse at the Army Foundation College in Harrogate, published in November 2024 – we felt it was pertinent to summarise the Inquiry’s findings, with a focus on the impact on children.
About the Inquiry
Why the Inquiry was held
The Service Inquiry convened on 30 June 2023 and covered the period between March 2021 and November 2023. The Inquiry was established following ‘several recent allegations of unacceptable behaviour’ across the Army but focused specifically on initial Army training establishments, which had given them ‘cause for concern’.
UK law requires that a Service Inquiry must be held in the event of the death or serious injury of service personnel or civilians in relation to Army activities; it can also be held to look into any matter when it is determined that ‘anything of consequence may be learned’. It should be noted that a Service Inquiry ‘does not attribute blame and has no power to attribute civil or criminal liability’.
What the Panel was asked to examine
The three-person Panel was tasked with investigating how Army Training Establishments manage complaints of ‘unacceptable behaviours’, as well as to comment on, express opinions and provide recommendations to prevent recurrence of such abuses. At the same time, the Panel was not able to investigate the specifics of cases that were ‘under investigation by other agencies’. It is further important to note that, while the Service Inquiry examined whether instructors had completed the training required before taking up post, they did not assess the content or quality of those courses.
There were three limitations placed on the Panel’s work. Firstly, the Panel could not look at cases under investigation by other agencies – which excludes some of the most serious allegations. Secondly, in assessing instructor training, the Inquiry only examined whether required courses had been completed, not whether those courses met civilian standards; the findings therefore, tell us whether the Army is meeting its own standards, not whether those standards are adequate. Lastly and most significantly – and most pertinent to CRIN’s work – was that the Panel was not asked to consider whether children should be in these establishments in the first place. The presence of 16- and 17-year-olds at Army training establishments was treated as a background fact rather than a safeguarding question in its own right.
We would have welcomed terms of reference that did three further things: treated the recruitment and training of children as a distinct child protection issue requiring distinct scrutiny; examined the quality and content of safeguarding training, as well as the delivery of said training; and allowed the Panel to hear directly from former recruits and their families, whose accounts are absent from the report entirely.
When the Inquiry was published
Although the release of the Service Inquiry is welcome, the Army appears to have been forced into its publication following a threat of legal action by the Centre for Military Justice, on behalf of a client. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) had admitted liability in relation to multiple allegations of sexual assault perpetrated against the client while she was a trainee at AFC. The threat of legal action was initiated after the Army reneged on a commitment to provide her with a copy of the Service Inquiry, which she understood was undertaken as a consequence of her complaint.
This reluctance to publish the results of the Service Inquiry raises questions as to the Army’s transparency and its willingness to undertake the necessary reforms to ensure the safety of its trainees. The seriousness of the Inquiry’s findings - and their pertinence to the wellbeing of the Army’s youngest recruits - merits transparency and quick action, not secrecy and delay.
What the Inquiry found
The Panel recorded 69 separate observations related to ‘unacceptable behaviour’ at Army training establishments. The most serious of them concern:
Continuing problems in the manner in which staff are selected;
Whether training staff have received the required safeguarding training – and whether those staff have been properly background-checked to work with children;
The failure to implement policies on instructor-trainee ratios and caring for the most vulnerable trainees;
Allowing punishments for under-18s that are harsher than those allowed for adults, in continuing violation of Army policy;
Elements that fail the victims of sexual misconduct;
And poorly performing oversight regimes that mean these problems can perpetuate.
Key concerns
Instructors are selected without criteria, and work without background checks
The Inquiry noted a series of concerns related to the selection and training of instructors at Army training establishments. For one, for the vast proportion of appointments to initial Army training establishments, including Harrogate, there is no course assessing the capability of instructors and no guidance on the criteria to be used in selecting personnel. This is in contrast to the manner in which instructors are selected for Army officer training at Sandhurst, suggesting a two-tier approach. Worse, in a theme repeated throughout the report, the Inquiry found that ‘none of this is new’ and these shortcomings had been identified in previous reviews.
The Panel found that existing directives fail to specify which roles require what training and, consequently, staff ‘are not adequately trained’ in relation to known risks. The Panel went on to state that it is ‘nigh on impossible to assess’ whether staff hold the necessary mandatory qualifications, as the appropriate records are not maintained. These findings encompassed AFC and included whether AFC staff have completed mandatory welfare training. Furthermore, there is no policy stipulating the mandatory qualifications for different roles – including at AFC – and no clarity on which roles are recruit-facing or can have one-on-one contact with trainees. Job specifications for AFC welfare staff do not stipulate a requirement for ‘Care of Trainee’ training, contrary to Army regulations.
Of significant concern is the finding that instructors are continuing to start work ‘without the correct DBS in place’, which ‘contravenes both legal requirements and military policy’. Despite previous reviews, the lack of thorough DBS checks ‘remains a significant risk’. The fact that the Army is continuing to allow staff to work with children who have not undergone the legally required background checks, despite this issue being flagged previously, is alarming and possibly illegal.
The impact of these failings had also been flagged in a previous 2023 review, which also stated that ‘a considerable quantity’ of Army staff removed from posts were instructors at the training establishments. The Panel endorsed the review’s finding that the Army ‘continuously makes the same mistake … employing unsuitable instructors’ and that the ‘Army’s reputation is at risk of being deemed an unsuitable teaching organisation’.
There are too few staff, and no rule for how many there should be
The issue of supervisory care ratios – too few appropriately trained staff to properly supervise recruits – was examined by the Panel as ‘fundamental’ to ‘how trainees are cared for, developed, trained, and managed’. This issue had also been highlighted as critical in the Deepcut Review. Despite this, the Panel found that the Army still fails to provide adequate direction on supervisory care ratios, or to address specific points of risk to trainees (including at AFC). It is, frankly, astonishing that more than 20 years after Deepcut – viewed as the landmark review into military welfare in the Army’s history – no clear guidance exists on determining acceptable instructor-to-trainee ratios.
Other shortcomings in relation to supervisory care directives were also outlined in the Inquiry report. This included the fact that establishments do not prohibit under-18s from conducting armed guard duty and weapons security, including AFC – which is in direct non-compliance with Army policy.
Vulnerable recruits are not protected
Army training establishments were also found to be deficient in the areas of vulnerability risk management – the manner in which the Army ensures the early identification, management and continuous review of vulnerable personnel at risk of self-harm, suicide, and other personal safety issues. The Inquiry found that the Commanding Officers are not consistently ensuring that policies and practices conform to Army regulations on vulnerability risk management; the required additional training was also not being provided to staff. Furthermore, neither of these failures had been identified by existing internal oversight systems. In a regular theme throughout the Inquiry, the Panel highlighted that these changes should have been implemented in light of recommendations from previous inquiries (in this instance, the Dhali-Blake and Death at RMAS 2019 recommendations).
The AFC supervisory care directive was identified as failing to ensure adequate risk management for recruits displaying self-harming or suicidal ideation behaviours. The report criticises the AFC directive as one that ‘directly contradicts Army policy’, meaning that the AFC is ‘not implementing best practice’; instead, they are adding risk to trainees ‘who are already a vulnerable cohort’.
Furthermore, the Panel found no evidence that the Deepcut Review recommendation – which required Bullying, Harassment and Discrimination leaflets to be issued to all trainees – has been implemented at any Army training establishment, including AFC. The right of trainees to call the civilian police was not being explained, and welfare cards contain no information on how to contact civilian emergency services.
Punishments are harsher for children than for adults
The Panel also expressed a series of concerns related to how recruits are allowed to be punished, euphemistically referred to as ‘remedial training’. Their concerns were founded on the unclear and inconsistent guidance given to instructors on the steps they may take to punish recruits, as well as policies on punishment, including those at AFC. These lack of guidelines do not comply with wider Army regulations.
At AFC specifically, the report identifies three compounding risks in their approach to punishing under-18 recruits. Firstly, sanctions available for under-18 recruits are actually more onerous than those permitted for adult recruits. For example, the AFC allows a punishment of 60 press-ups in 45 minutes, three times the amount allowed for adult soldiers at other Army Initial Training Establishments. Furthermore, methods prohibited by the Army – including what they describe as ‘leopard crawling’ and ‘fire and movement’ – remain explicitly permitted under AFC policy. Alarmingly, we are not told why these punishments are dangerous for children, only that the Service Inquiry says they should be banned.
Secondly, rather than following established Army policy that it is the role of permanent staff to make records of punishments conducted, AFC policy directs the trainees to record each intervention in their own record book – checked only weekly by the Platoon Commander and monthly by the Commanding Officer (CO). This was viewed by the Panel as ‘wholly inadequate for the incumbent risk’.
Finally, the AFC is failing to inform trainees of the nature and extent of acceptable punishments, and who can impose them, which means the system is open to abuse. Once again, this practice is at odds with the Deepcut Review recommendations from 2006.
The report’s authors were so concerned by these findings that they ‘immediately wrote to the AFC Chain of Command, making them aware of what had been found and making recommendations for immediate investigation and review’.
The Army cannot criticise the Army
The Panel determined that the current oversight systems at AFC failed to identify and rectify ‘a plethora of issues’ across the training establishments, with managers placing too much trust in inadequate systems. The same non-compliant policies had been present in two previous AFC directives, meaning that oversight systems at AFC had failed, for years, to identify any concerns.
The Panel discovered that the Independent Advisory Panels (IAPs) – bodies that were founded 20 years ago following the deaths at Deepcut barracks – were unable to effectively exercise their oversight role, given their contradictory purpose to promote ‘both the Army and Training Establishment's reputation’. The Panel was further dismissive in its assessment of Army internal mechanisms for conducting oversight through audits, stating that it was ‘very quickly apparent’ that ‘the quality and quantity’ of information in the audit reports was ‘poor’. The Panel said that it was unsurprising that useful oversight is not provided, given the IAPs lack of independence, but they were concerned that they audit such critical areas as Vulnerability Risk Management.
It should be noted that the Service Inquiry focused exclusively on the Army’s own oversight mechanisms, including the IAPs. The Service Inquiry should have looked more broadly at other external oversight bodies – particularly given they identified shortcomings in existing internal reviews. For example, the Inquiry could have looked at Ofsted’s relationship with the Army and the extent to which it provides meaningful insight into the effectiveness of welfare and safeguarding, as it is mandated to do. CRIN has previously expressed concerns about the failings of Ofsted oversight at AFC. Any review of the oversight at Army training establishments should have included a review of Ofsted's role in ensuring the wellbeing and safeguarding of under-18 year old recruits. There should have also been a summary of what should be in place for an effective overall independent oversight going forward.
‘Zero Tolerance’ policies on paper, not in reality
One of the key tasks of the Panel was to assess the implementation of the Army’s 2022 policies on ‘Zero Tolerance’ to sexual offences, to relationships between instructors and trainees, and towards unacceptable sexual behaviour more broadly. The Panel determined that, despite this apparent ‘zero tolerance’, a range of lighter sanctions were actually being applied. Even worse, in nearly half of all cases related to sexual misconduct, termination of service did not occur – no instructors were being fired. Worryingly, victims were also not consulted when determining whether sanctions should be placed.
That said, the vast majority of cases never even reach the stage where sanctions are assigned: 80 per cent are dealt with informally. The Panel believed that victims are likely to feel self-induced pressure to ask for informal resolution instead, especially because of the potential consequences for the perpetrator if formal resolution is pursued. The Panel highlighted the ‘exceptional bravery’ of the survivors who choose to raise concerns of unacceptable behaviour in the Army, and that to seek a formal resolution may feel like a ‘step too far’.
The policy is effectively asking a survivor to determine whether the behaviour they were subjected to was so egregious that they wish to follow a process - a process which could terminate their perpetrator’s service in the Army, or whether they wished to request a sanction on the perpetrator that would result in them being able to maintain their Army employment. The Panel found that many young recruits were being put under ‘too much pressure’ as to whether they wished to end a fellow soldier's Army career - and that the Chain of Command should instead play a more direct role in determining action.
It is also worth noting that in many cases, the Panel was unable to determine who the victims were in cases of administrative action for poor conduct (i.e where the offence was not judged to be criminal but was still judged to be against Army regulations), due to poor record-keeping by the Army. The Panel stated that this poor record-keeping prevented their ability to assess trends that could help prevent harm.
The Inquiry did note some progress in the area of tackling inappropriate sexual behaviour. The Panel found that there was a good understanding of the policies across AFC staff and recruits that had ‘started conversations’ across all ranks. It was notable that 20 per cent of complaints had been reported by a third party, rather than the victim.
Female recruits are treated differently
More broadly, the Inquiry further identified ongoing problems with sexism at training establishments. Female trainees told the Panel they felt they were ‘not wanted’, that females were deemed to be ‘too much trouble’, and that it was ‘rough being female’ in the Army. The Panel were concerned for the youngest female recruits – who could be as young as 16 – ‘who were not confident enough to report or call out unacceptable sexual behaviour or sexism’. One example of the poor treatment of female service personnel the Panel identified related to the provision of sanitary products. Despite a commitment from the MoD, the Panel found ( with one exception) no evidence that sanitary products had been provided. Worse, because female trainees were required to empty the used sanitary product bins themselves at certain establishments, the Panel went as far as to say that the Army was treating them as ‘second-class citizens’.
Inquiry conclusions
The Panel provided 13 recommendations to address the findings of the Inquiry. The senior Army officer responsible for establishing the Panel endorsed all 13 recommendations – and the Head of the Army Personnel Services Group has subsequently stated that 12 of the 13 recommendations had been ‘actioned and closed’ as of the report's publication, with the final recommendation expected to be implemented ‘by Autumn 2025’; however, this deadline has already passed by the time this report was made public in January 2026. It is also worth noting that the Head of Army Personnel Services Group did not acknowledge the recommendations of previous inquiries, nor addressed the failure to implement these previous findings.
CRIN’s response
In response, CRIN will attempt to establish the extent to which these recommendations have been implemented on the ground, particularly in relation to the under-18 recruits at the Army Foundation College in Harrogate. The Panel’s proposed recommendations are significant in several areas, including:
Requirements for the Army to finally provide direction on instructor selection criteria, along the lines of those at Sandhurst, and applying policies on the required training and qualifications for every role;
Bringing all supervisory care directives – as well as policies and practices on vulnerability risk management – into line with overarching Army safeguarding policies;
Agreeing that the punishment of recruits should also be consistent with Army policy – and under-18s must not be subjected to harsher punishments than adults, as has been the case at AFC.
However, disappointingly, we feel that other recommendations fall short of the actions required based on the findings of the report. For example, the recommendations that address the Army’s failing oversight regime are weak, and refer only to the Army’s system of internal auditing – rather than the more serious question of the absence of effective independent oversight. CRIN believes that the establishment of a robust and effective external oversight body is long overdue – especially at AFC Harrogate – and improvements to internal auditing, while useful, will not assist in this regard.
Similarly, we believe the Panel’s recommendations regarding the Army’s ‘Zero Tolerance’ policies on sexual misconduct are insufficient. The report merely proposes amendments to be ‘considered’ rather than using language that would require the Army to act. Under-18-year-old female trainees need significant changes to their current protections to ensure their wellbeing. And significantly, there is no recommendation that would remedy the absence of data on the victims of sexual misconduct.
What comes next
Many of these findings will feel familiar to anyone who has followed CRIN’s work on military recruitment in the UK. For years, we have argued – based on the testimonies of former recruits, their parents and former AFC staff, as well as the data obtained through Freedom of Information requests – that the Army Foundation College is not a safe place for children. The bodies meant to oversee AFC are not independent of it. And the Army cannot be relied upon to correct its own actions. When we make these arguments to the Army and the MoD, however, we have consistently been met with the same reply: that the College is rated ‘Outstanding’ by Ofsted and is monitored by an Independent Advisory Panel.
Yet, this Service Inquiry was conducted by the Army to look into the Army. And its own report found that the current assurance regimes were ‘ineffective’. It determined that the poor inspection criteria and poor implementation of investigations – including those by Ofsted – had produced inaccurate results that overlooked basic failures and had made training establishments and Army senior leadership over-confident, giving them a sense of ‘false confidence’. Most pressingly, the report concluded that because one of the Independent Advisory Panel’s stated purposes is to promote the reputation of the Army (as well as the establishments it monitors)... the Panel ‘can never be truly critical of the Training Establishment’. It is difficult to imagine a more direct vindication of what survivors have been telling CRIN for over a decade: that the Army cannot be trusted to be transparent when something goes wrong when recruits are being trained.
CRIN will be publishing a joint report with Childlight on child safeguarding at the Army Foundation College later this year. Our report draws on the testimony of former recruits, parents and staff; on Ofsted’s own inspection records; and on data from the MoD. It sets out numerous recommendations for AFC; but, most importantly, it argues for why the recruitment of under-18s in the UK should end – and that the Army Foundation College should close. Readers who want the fuller picture – including as to how the Service Inquiry’s findings sits alongside the rest of CRIN’s decades of evidence – will find our detailed summary of the Inquiry there.
Yet, despite this Inquiry’s shortcomings, CRIN hopes the Army will treat the Panel’s report with the seriousness it deserves, and will seek to properly remedy the numerous failings identified. However, given that the outcome of numerous previous reviews has never been implemented… it’s hard to believe the Army will step up and protect those who sign up to serve.
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