Findings

 

Main challenges to accountability for child sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers

 

Under-reporting

There is chronic under-reporting by sexual exploitation and abuse victims and survivors, particularly when it comes to children. They may refrain from reporting due to stigma, fear of reprisals, ignorance of their rights and options for redress, or a feeling of powerlessness. The perception that there is little to gain from speaking out (due to ineffective responses) is another major barrier to reporting.13 It is imperative that victims and survivors know their rights, know where to report, are able to do so safely, and can obtain immediate assistance.

 

Inadequate criminal investigations

There remains major shortcomings in investigative processes both at the UN and TCC levels. The UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), which investigates allegations related to UN field missions, can easily be perceived as lacking in independence. Meanwhile, TCCs have exclusive jurisdiction to conduct criminal investigations of their nationals, but they rarely do so. In any event, the quality of both UN and TCC investigations has been heavily criticised.14 Fact-finding is frequently delayed and insufficient; investigations are lengthy; and investigators are not properly trained and lack expertise in child protection, safeguarding and mental health. This seriously compromises the quality of criminal evidence that can be collected, along with victims’ and survivors’ access to justice.

 

Defensive UN institutions

When sexual exploitation and abuse allegations surface, many actors in the UN accountability chain remain on the defensive, and an institutionalised climate of secrecy persists. Despite a stated shift to a victim-centred approach, 15 there is still a tendency to deflect public attention, protect the organisation, and shift blame onto TCCs. In addition, UN initiatives have usually been taken in a reactive manner, as a response to scandals and media leaks, leading to a number of statements of principles and individual disciplinary procedures rather than evidence-based, long-term systemic improvements. 16

Immunity and jurisdictional challenges

The UN’s founding treaties provide that its peacekeepers enjoy immunity from legal processes in host countries:
  • Military peacekeeping personnel remain under the exclusive jurisdiction of their national governments. Under both the UN Status-of-Forces Agreement (SOFA) 17 between the UN and host country, and the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 18 between TCCs and the UN, TCCs have the primary authority and exclusive responsibility to investigate allegations implicating their nationals and, where appropriate, impose criminal sanctions. The UN can initiate investigations where TCCs are unwilling or unable to do so, but without TCC follow-up, these remain fruitless.
  • Civilian peacekeeping personnel are also protected from any legal process for all acts performed in their official capacity. Although sexual exploitation and abuse do not constitute official acts of a UN employee, and should therefore be excluded from this functional immunity, the UN reserves the right to determine whether immunity applies. This means that personnel are shielded from legal processes in host countries while protracted UN investigations are ongoing.

In practice, this means that immunity and jurisdiction agreements consistently frustrate efforts to seek accountability for sexual abuses committed by military and civilian UN peacekeepers.

Lack of political will at TCC level

Countries contributing troops to UN peacekeeping operations consistently fail to investigate (or to adequately investigate) allegations of sexual misconduct by their soldiers. When prosecutions do occur, they lack transparency (particularly in military courts), and rarely result in convictions. 19 There is also a general lack of adherence to the concept of troop accountability among many TCCs, with their own national armies often committing crimes on their own territory with total impunity.

Difficulties linked to transnational aspect of prosecutions

Another major obstacle to accountability for sexual abuse committed by peacekeepers is the fact that it is necessarily an international endeavour, involving work in at least two legal jurisdictions, across great geographical distances, in different languages, and with a range of actors with varying agendas. Supporting evidence-gathering, criminal prosecutions and the enforcement of judgments in these circumstances is extremely challenging. Very few, if any, advocates have the required resources and breadth of expertise to take on this challenge.

 
 
 
 
 
 

What has been done by the UN, and is it working?

 

The 2014 scandal in CAR precipitated a series of UN initiatives, starting with an independent review on sexual exploitation and abuse committed by international forces in the country. The review, published in December 2015, proposed a series of recommendations “to undertake meaningful organisational change.”20 High-profile policies, mechanisms and initiatives adopted since then include:

  • February 2016: Establishment of a Special Coordinator on improving the UN response to sexual exploitation and abuse. The mandate is to increase coordination between various UN entities and there has been a clear improvement on that front and the office seems to have a good general overview of the response being rolled out both at HQ and field levels.21 In 2022, Christian Saunders became a full-time, dedicated Under-Secretary-General to carry out the Special Coordinator role. He succeeded Jane Holl Lute, whose level of engagement with her part-time mandate has been previously criticised by civil society.22
  • March 2016: Creation of a Trust Fund for victims to support specialised assistance needed by sexual exploitation and abuse survivors and any children born as a result of sexual violence, and strengthen community outreach.23 However, it is desperately underfunded and does not appear to have a systematic way of operating. Critics point out that its severely limited funds have been spent on small community projects, in peacekeeping countries, which do not appear to explicitly address the needs of victims and survivors of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers.24
  • March 2016: Adoption by the UN Security Council of Resolution (UNSCR) 2272, which asks the Secretary-General to remove entire contingents from any TCC that fails to hold perpetrators accountable.25 In June 2017, the Republic of Congo withdrew its peacekeepers from CAR following a UN review that found a high number of allegations against the contingent. However, this decision was tardy and made under pressure after NGOs leaked internal UN documents.26 In 2021, the whole Gabonese peacekeeping contingent was withdrawn from the UN mission in the CAR over sexual abuse allegations.27 Despite some improvement, UNSCR 2272 is not being systematically applied.28
  • August 2017: Establishment of a Victims’ Rights Advocate (VRA), with Jane Connors appointed in September of the same year. Her role is to represent victims and survivors, and put their rights and voices at the centre of sexual exploitation and abuse responses, working with all parts of the UN system as well as governments and civil society organisations.29 The VRA has limited funding and capacity, and some have raised questions about an inherent conflict of interest in her mandate.30 However, given her expertise in human rights and her frequent meetings for civil society, she is well-respected and perceived as an ally in efforts to improve victim support.31 In 2020, the VRA adopted a victim-centred approach into system-wide efforts to address sexual exploitation and abuse.32 While progress has been made in one peacekeeping mission, it is yet to be fully operationalised.33
  • In addition, the UN has generally stepped up efforts to increase reporting. Initiatives such as establishing focal points for receiving complaints, ‘shark watch’, “No Excuses cards” and others encourage internal UN reporting.34 Community outreach has also been expanded with social media, text messaging and radio campaigns to promote the use of hot lines or community-based complaint mechanisms.35 However, these measures have had a very limited impact and underreporting remains a serious concern. Much more work is required to ensure that victims/survivors, and those who report on their behalf, are protected when they come forward, and are guaranteed a response.
  • Prevention measures were also increased, particularly in the wake of UNSCR 2272 (2016). Reforms have included more thorough vetting and training of UN personnel pre-deployment, by both TCCs and the UN. At TCC level, many countries have placed their military contingents under stricter engagement rules with obligations to respect a curfew, avoid out-of-bound areas, wear uniforms at all times, and follow non-fraternisation policies.36 Civil society in both CAR and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have reported on the positive impact of these recent prevention measures. In addition, since the ground-breaking UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, there has been a big push to promote women’s participation in peacekeeping missions, as this has shown to result in more efficient interventions to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse among other protection objectives. Some UN Member States, including Canada, have made this goal one of their priorities.37

So what has changed so far? Unfortunately, not much. Despite these important institutional reforms and initiatives, accountability for sexual abuse within UN peacekeeping missions remains elusive and victims/survivors continue to be left without redress.

The same challenges continue to create significant obstacles to accountability: from under-reporting and the poor quality of investigations carried out, to the issue of immunities and the exclusive jurisdiction of TCCs, combined with persistent lack of genuine political will. The UN continues to fail to certify, in individual cases, that functional immunity does not apply to sexual exploitation and abuse allegations. And there is no published policy on how the UN makes decisions on certification. Lack of transparency remains another major concern, as information made public is not sufficient to measure the progress of complaints and assist victims and their representatives.

Although the UN has made some progress on coordination and communication about allegations of sexual abuse by its peacekeepers, impunity persists. The reality is that both the UN and TCCs have been unwilling or unable to take the necessary measures and make the necessary changes to promptly and systematically investigate and prosecute troops accused of sexual abuse.

 

What are the changes that we need to see?

 

At the UN level

The survivor/victim-centred approach is at the forefront of all efforts to prevent and respond to sexual exploitation and abuse:

  • Increased awareness across the UN about the victim-centred approach through development of normative guidelines and their incorporation into existing UN policies, regulations and rules, frameworks and trainings.
  • Increased funding for the victim-centred approach and its implementation across the System.

Reporting of allegations is made accessible and safe for victims/survivors and carers:

  • Local communities are regularly informed about their rights, and made to feel empowered and supported to report abuse, including in remote areas.
  • Independent, impartial and confidential reporting mechanisms are put in place – this means they should not be embedded in UN peacekeeping missions.
  • A victims/survivor-centred approach is adopted from the moment allegations are made and in every subsequent interaction.
  • Survivors are protected from stigma, discrimination, retaliation and re-traumatisation.
  • Timely and consistent information is given to complainants on the progress and outcome of investigations.

Investigations are timely, independent, efficient and survivor-centred:

  • Investigations start immediately after an allegation is reported.
  • Investigating teams include gender experts, mental health and psychosocial (MHPSS) experts, as well as experts on working with child victims of sexual abuse.
  • Complainants are fully informed at every stage of the investigation and are able to provide their consent or objection regarding any actions taken on their behalf.
  • Investigating teams adhere to the “do no harm principle” and take into account the wellbeing, security and specific needs of survivors, as well as coordinate their referral to prompt and professional support and services.
  • OIOS investigators are placed outside UN peacekeeping missions to ensure operational independence and impartiality in investigations.
  • Investigations are transparent, and information regularly shared with victims’ lawyers.

UN Member States are pressed or incentivised to pursue accountability:

  • The UN Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) systematically follows up TCC investigations ad prosecutions for child abuse, applying pressure when needed.
  • Member States who fail to investigate allegations are named and shamed by the UNSG.
  • UNSC Resolution 2272 is systematically implemented and national contingents repatriated if there is “credible evidence” of “widespread or systematic abuse” (and what is understood by both terms should be clearly defined).
  • OLA adopts more transparent decision-making processes for determining whether functional immunity applies to alleged perpetrators, and publishes its decisions.
  • Accountability requirements of MOUs between TCCs and the UN are strengthened.

The prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers is linked to UN conflict-related mandates:

  • National armed forces that are listed as perpetrators of grave violations in the annexes of the UNSG’s annual reports on conflict-related sexual violence and children and armed conflict automatically fail vetting to contribute troops to peacekeeping missions.
  • The UNSG and DPO systematically encourage TCCs to deploy a bigger proportion of women when they contribute troops.
  • Troops from armed forces that have a record of human rights violations are not considered for peacekeeping operations.
 

“The reality is that both the UN and troop-contributing countries have been unwilling or unable to take the necessary measures and make the necessary changes."

 

At the TCC level

Improved quality of investigations into allegations of child sexual exploitation and abuse by nationals:

  • National investigators are swiftly appointed in response to UN requests to investigate.
  • Investigations meet the standards of swiftness, impartiality and effectiveness required under international human rights law;38
  • Investigating teams include specialist child abuse experts to ensure the quality of evidence gathered without posing risks to children concerned.39
  • Investigations follow a victim-centred approach by providing mental health and psycho-social support to victims and survivors, taking into account the particular needs of children.

Laws/policies are revised to assert jurisdiction over sexual exploitation and abuse crimes committed overseas:

  • Military and civilian criminal procedures are amended to make them suitable for prosecuting crimes taken place overseas;
  • Prosecution processes, particularly military prosecution processes, are sufficiently transparent to enable victims/survivors and their lawyers to determine the outcome of prosecutions and to participate in the process.
 

What is being done by human rights advocates, and is it working?

 

Over the years, at the international level, many human rights organisations have conducted advocacy directly targeting the UN and calling for investigations into sexual exploitation and abuse allegations, better transparency, improved victim support, and accountability and reparations for survivors.40 However, our analysis has shown that, with the exception of long-term campaigns by a few dedicated organisations,41 most actions have been isolated and short-term, generally driven by global outrage following each new public allegation.42

At the country level, many organisations have documented cases of sexual abuse by peacekeepers and conducted evidence-based advocacy with their governments.43 However, such initiatives often focus on providing support and services for survivors of sexual exploitation and abuse as part of the wider conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) or child protection in emergencies (CPiE) agendas. As demonstrated by the REDRESS and CRIN report, there have also been a few initiatives to litigate on behalf of victims/survivors with limited success. But these efforts do not aim to effect long-term, systemic changes within the UN and TCC governments.

This is why human rights advocacy efforts have so far failed to create the necessary concerted and sustained pressure on all relevant actors and jurisdictions involved, to initiate necessary institutional changes listed above, and achieve accountability for sexual exploitation and abuse crimes. It is also impossible for only a handful of specialist organisations to apply meaningful pressure on the UN and concerned TCC governments and make a systemic difference in this space.

 
 

Proposing a new approach

 

Consultations with key actors led us to believe that there are two new strategic approaches which could help us to overcome the challenges above, and successfully pressure both the UN and concerned TCC governments to make the necessary systemic reforms and achieve accountability for child sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers:

  • Forming a coalition on sexual exploitation and abuse accountability – to create a sustained campaign for UN reform
  • Engaging in strategic litigation – to enable child survivors to access justice and push for subsequent TCC reform
 

Strategic engagement amongst partners to create a sustained campaign for UN reform

Many parts of the UN’s architecture need to reform in order to make accountability for child sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers possible: the office of the UNSG, the Victims’ Rights Advocate, the Office of Legal Affairs, the Office of Internal Oversight Services, the leadership and structure of Peacekeeping Missions, and more.

Therefore, a wide range of capacities and expertise is required to lead a successful campaign towards relevant UN institutions and agencies in New York, Geneva, host countries and TCCs. Since no single actor has all the required capacity and geographical reach to effectively campaign for all these reforms, there is a strong need to collaborate.

Creating a coalition would allow us to pool expertise and experience in different geographical locations and at multiple levels, leveraging the strength of each partner to reinforce one another’s work and achieve the desired systemic changes at various UN levels.

Drawing from the idea of “clever coalitions” developed by Crisis Action,44 this strategy proposes launching a ‘coalition’ composed of selected individuals and organisations, each with their regional or thematic expertise, working towards the common goal of accountability for child sexual abuse cases in the peacekeeping context. This will allow us to broaden the base for our outreach and advocacy; bring in a much-needed diversity of approaches and experiences, and break down the magnitude and complexity of a seemingly intractable problem.

 

Strategic litigation to enable child survivors to access justice and push for subsequent TCC reform

There have been very limited attempts at strategic litigation to pursue justice for child survivors of sexual abuse committed by peacekeepers. When CRIN and REDRESS organised their workshop in November 2019, all participants agreed that there was great, untapped potential and opportunities for strategic litigation to be used as an instrument to challenge the widespread impunity of child sexual abuse committed by peacekeepers.

Research conducted by REDRESS and CRIN revealed that some of the challenges faced by those who attempted litigation on behalf of survivors of sexual abuse by peacekeepers can be overcome through strategic litigation. This methodology combines legal cases with other strategies such as advocacy, communication, and activism to ensure there is a community behind the client, an impact after the judgement, and a cause beyond the case. Successful strategic litigation has a great potential to effect key legal, policy and institutional changes which will constitute long-term prevention. In the process, survivors are also provided with psychosocial rehabilitation and empowered to become advocates for their own cause, where they wish and are able to do so.

In particular, we currently see opportunities to pursue strategic litigation across CAR, DRC, Haiti, Uruguay, Sri Lanka and France. Developing strategic litigation in these countries, would require a project lasting a minimum of three years.

We therefore believe that the pursuit of well-selected strategic litigation cases, across a small number of countries, by a coalition of groups with complementary expertise and outreach, can be used as a key component of a wider global advocacy strategy to pursue systemic reform on accountability for child abuse in peacekeeping contexts.

 

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***

Footnotes

13 See Save the Children, No One to Turn To: the under-reporting of child sexual exploitation and abuse by aid workers and peacekeepers (2008). See also Inter-Agency Standing Committee Task Force, Model Complaints and Investigations Procedures and Guidance Related to Sexual Abuse and Sexual Exploitation, (March 2004), https://pseataskforce.org/uploads/tools/modelcomplaintsandinvestigationproceduresandguidancerelatedtoseadraft_iasctaskforceonpsea_english.pdf


14 See for example CRIN and REDRESS, Litigating Peacekeeper Child Sexual Abuse (December 2019): https://home.crin.org/issues/sexual-violence/un-peacekeepers/litigation-report, p. 50; and The New Humanitarian, “Blunders in Central African Republic Sex Abuse Probe detailed in internal UN review” (31 October 2019): https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/investigations/2019/10/31/Central-African-Republic-sex-abuse-probe-internal-UN-review


15 The UN has been criticised for failing to put victims and survivors at the centre of their response to SEA, particularly following the events in CAR. The review of the UN cross-agency response to the 2014 allegations in CAR found, amongst other conclusions, that the welfare of victims “appeared to be an afterthought, if considered at all.” Issues related to the lack of accessibility to reporting, the independence of the investigations, and the difficulties for victims/survivors to obtain progress of the investigations on their allegations, as well as a failure to provide adequate victim support. This led the UNSG to adopt a number of measures that were meant to shift the organisation’s focus towards victims/survivors. The intention to “integrate a victim-centred approach” across relevant UN institutions is reflected in the Report of the Secretary-General, Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse - A/73/744 (14 February 2019): https://undocs.org/en/A/73/744


16 Jasmine-Kim Westendorf and Louise Searle, Sexual Exploitation and abuse in peace operations: trends, policy responses, and future directions, International Affairs 93:2 (1 March 2017).


17 See UN Digital Library, Model Status-of-Forces Agreement for Peace-keeping Operations: report of the Secretary-General – A/45/594 (October 1990): https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/101559?ln=en


18 See UN Department of Peace Operations: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/deployment-and-reimbursement


19 See CRIN and REDRESS, Litigating Peacekeeper Child Sexual Abuse (December 2019): https://home.crin.org/issues/sexual-violence/un-peacekeepers/litigation-report


20 Marie Deschamps, Hassan B. Jallow and Yasmin Sooka, Taking action on SEA by peacekeepers: report of an independent review on SEA by international peacekeeping forces in the CAR (December 2015): https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Independent-Review-Report.pdf


21 “Secretary-General Appoints Jane Holl Lute of United States as Special Coordinator on Improving United Nations Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse” (8 February 2016): https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sga1634.doc.htm


22 Code Blue, The Secretary-General is Right: His “New Approach” to UN Sex Abuse Failed (18 March 2022): http://www.codebluecampaign.com/press-releases/2022/3/18


23 Report of the Secretary-General on Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse – A/70/729 (16 February 2016): https://undocs.org/A/70/729


24 Code Blue (February 2019): http://www.codebluecampaign.com/victims-trust-fund


25 “Security Council Asks Secretary-General to Replace Contingents from Countries Failing to Hold Sexual Predators Accountable” (11 March 2016): https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12277.doc.htm and resulting UNSC Resolution 2272 (2016): https://undocs.org/S/RES/2272(2016)


26 Code Blue (June 2017): http://www.codebluecampaign.com/press-releases/2017/6/20


27 Aljazeera, “UN withdraws Gabon peacekeepers from CAR over sex abuse claims” (15 September 2021): https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/15/un-withdraws-gabon-peacekeepers-from-car-over-sex-abuse-claims


28 AIDS-Free World, “A Record of Shame: Burundi Does Not Belong in UN peacekeeping” (16 July 2019): https://aidsfreeworld.org/statements/2019/7/16/a-record-of-shame-burundi-does-not-belong


29 Webpage of the Victims’ Rights Advocate: https://www.un.org/preventing-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse/content/victims-rights-advocate


30 Code Blue, The UN’s Victims’ Rights Advocate: A Hindrance to Justice (28 June 2018): http://www.codebluecampaign.com/analysis/2018/6/28/vra


31 Interviews with UN stakeholders, New York, October 2019


32 Report of the Secretary-General on Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse – A/76/702 (15 February 2022): https://undocs.org/A/76/702, paragraph 31


33 The UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), Evaluation of the prevention, response and victim support efforts against sexual exploitation and abuse by United Nations Secretariat staff and related personnel (March 2021): https://oios.un.org/file/8999/download?token=fANcn0TK, paragraph 135, 136


34 Interview with key UN stakeholder, October 2019; Whenever troops go out, one in every seven is appointed ‘shark watch’ with the responsibility to ensure the group is safe and behaves appropriately. See OIOS report (March 2021), paragraph 37


35 Report of the Secretary-General on Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse – A/70/729 (16 February 2016): https://undocs.org/A/70/729, paragraph 47


36 See Report of the Secretary-General on Combating sexual exploitation and abuse – A/71/97 (23 June 2016): https://undocs.org/a/71/97, paragraphs 16 and 22; UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO) on Training: https://conduct.unmissions.org/prevention-training and on Vetting https://conduct.unmissions.org/prevention-vetting; OIOS report (March 2021), paragraph 37


37 See UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000): https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/1325%282000%29 and the Government of Canada’s National Action Plan for the Implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security 2017-2022: https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/gender_equality-egalite_des_genres/cnap_wps-pnac_fps.aspx?lang=eng


38 See CRIN and REDRESS, Litigating Peacekeeper Child Sexual Abuse (December 2019): https://home.crin.org/issues/sexual-violence/un-peacekeepers/litigation-report, Chapter 7


39 Taking guidance from relevant international standards, including:
• Sara Ferro Ribeiro and Danaé van der Straten Ponthoz on behalf of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, International Protocol on the Documentation and Investigation of Sexual Violence in Conflict Best Practice on the Documentation of Sexual Violence as a Crime or Violation of International Law Second Edition (March 2017): https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/598335/International_Protocol_2017_2nd_Edition.pdf
• Murad Code: an international code of conduct for the accountability-relevant documentation of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence. See: https://www.muradcode.com/murad-code
• The Institute of International Criminal Investigations is currently developing written guidelines for the accountability-focused investigation of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and systematic and grave human rights violations against and otherwise involving children. See: https://iici.global/2019/03/07/iicidevelopment-of-guidelines-for-investigating-internationalcrimes-and-systematic-human-rights-violations-involvingchildren


40 See for example: “UN response to sex abuse whistleblower is 'deeply unsatisfactory' - open letter” (11 May 2015): https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/may/11/un-response-to-sex-abuse-whistleblower-is-deeply-unsatisfactory-open-letter


41 See for example Code Blue Campaign: http://www.codebluecampaign.com and AIDS-Free World: https://aidsfreeworld.org


42 See for example The New Humanitarian, “Blunders in Central African Republic Sex Abuse Probe detailed in internal UN review” (31 October 2019): https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/investigations/2019/10/31/Central-African-Republic-sex-abuse-probe-internal-UN-review


43 Amnesty International, “CAR: UN investigations into fresh allegations of sex abuse underlines need for peacekeeper accountability” (6 January 2016): https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/01/car-un-investigations-into-fresh-allegations-of-sex-abuse-underlines-need-for-peacekeeper-accountability/; Human Rights Watch, “UN: Stop Sexual Abuse by Peacekeepers” (4 March 2016): https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/04/un-stop-sexual-abuse-peacekeepers. Academics have also published numerous research reports looking at the psychosocial impact of sexual abuse on victims/survivors, at the racial and gendered biases underlining the power dynamics between the local population and peacekeepers. See for example Katherine Jennings “Service, Sex, and Security: Gendered Peacekeeping Economies in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo” (2014) 45 Security Dialogue 313 at 315.


44 Crisis Action, Creative Coalitions: A Handbook for Change (August 2017): https://crisisaction.org/wp-content/pdf/creative-coalitions-a-handbook-for-change.pdf